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'Missile Crisis' redirects here. For the Cyprus Missile Crisis, see. Cuban Missile Crisis Part of the intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missile (NATO designation SS-4) in Moscow Date October 16–28, 1962 (naval blockade of Cuba ended November 20, 1962) Location Result • Withdrawal of the Soviet Union's nuclear missiles from Cuba • Withdrawal of American nuclear missiles from and • Agreement with the Soviet Union that the United States would never invade Cuba without direct provocation • Creation of a between the United States and the Soviet Union Belligerents Supported by: Supported by: Commanders and leaders. Contents • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Earlier US actions The U.S. Was concerned about an expansion of, and a country openly allying with the Soviet Union was regarded by it as unacceptable since the end of, and the start of the. Such an involvement would also directly defy the, a U.S.

Policy limiting U.S. Involvement in European colonies and European affairs but holding that the was in the U.S.. The Kennedy administration had been publicly embarrassed by the failed in April, 1961, which had been launched under President by -trained forces of. Afterward, former President told Kennedy that 'the failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do.' : 10 The half-hearted invasion left Soviet premier and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet adviser wrote, 'too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations. Too intelligent and too weak.'

Covert operations against Cuba continued in 1961 with the unsuccessful. In addition, Khrushchev's impression of Kennedy's weaknesses was confirmed by the President's response during the, particularly to the building of the. Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev asserted, 'I know for certain that Kennedy doesn't have a strong background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge.' He also told his son that on Cuba, Kennedy 'would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree.' In January, 1962, General described plans to overthrow the Cuban government in a top-secret report (partially declassified 1989), addressed to Kennedy and officials involved with Operation Mongoose. CIA agents or 'pathfinders' from the were to be infiltrated into Cuba to carry out sabotage and organization, including radio broadcasts.

In February, 1962, the US launched an, and Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban government, mandating guerrilla operations to begin in August and September. 'Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime' would occur in the first two weeks of October. Balance of power. This section needs additional citations for.

Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (October 2017) () When Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his key election issues was an alleged ' with the Soviets leading. In fact, the US led the Soviets by a wide margin that would only increase. In 1961, the Soviets had only four (). By October 1962, they may have had a few dozen, with some intelligence estimates as high as 75. The U.S., on the other hand, had 170 ICBMs and was quickly building more.

It also had eight - and, with the capability to launch 16 missiles, each with a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km). Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted to the world that the Soviets were building missiles 'like sausages' but Soviet missiles' numbers and capabilities actually were nowhere close to his assertions.

The Soviet Union had in quantity, about 700 of them, but they were very unreliable and inaccurate. The US had a considerable advantage in total number of nuclear warheads (27,000 against 3,600) and in the technology required for their accurate delivery. The US also led in missile defensive capabilities, naval and air power; but the Soviets had a 2-1 advantage in conventional ground forces, more pronounced in field guns and tanks, particularly in the European theater. Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba In May 1962, Soviet Premier was persuaded by the idea of countering the US's growing lead in developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, despite the misgivings of the Soviet Ambassador in Havana,, who argued that Castro would not accept the deployment of the missiles. Khrushchev faced a strategic situation in which the US was perceived to have a 'splendid ' capability that put the Soviet Union at a huge disadvantage. In 1962, the Soviets had only 20 capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the US from inside the Soviet Union.

The poor accuracy and reliability of the missiles raised serious doubts about their effectiveness. A newer, more reliable generation of ICBMs would become operational only after 1965. Therefore, Soviet nuclear capability in 1962 placed less emphasis on ICBMs than on medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles ( and ).

The missiles could hit American allies and most of from Soviet territory but not the. Graham Allison, the director of 's, points out, 'The Soviet Union could not right the nuclear imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. In order to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options. Moving existing nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets was one.'

A second reason that Soviet missiles were deployed to Cuba was because Khrushchev wanted to bring, controlled by the American, British and French within Communist, into the Soviet orbit. The East Germans and Soviets considered western control over a portion of a grave threat to East Germany.

Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battlefield of the Cold War. Khrushchev believed that if the US did nothing over the missile deployments in Cuba, he could muscle the West out of Berlin using said missiles as a deterrent to western countermeasures in Berlin. If the US tried to bargain with the Soviets after it became aware of the missiles, Khrushchev could demand trading the missiles for West Berlin.

Since Berlin was strategically more important than Cuba, the trade would be a win for Khrushchev, as Kennedy recognized: 'The advantage is, from Khrushchev's point of view, he takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to it.' More than 100 US-built missiles having the capability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads were in 1961. Khrushchev was also reacting in part to the nuclear threat of obsolescent intermediate-range ballistic missiles that had been installed by the US in Turkey in April 1962.

In early 1962, a group of Soviet military and missile construction specialists accompanied an agricultural delegation to Havana. They obtained a meeting with Cuban leader. The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the US would invade Cuba again and enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba.

However, according to another source, Castro objected to the missiles deployment that would have made him look like a Soviet puppet, but he was persuaded that missiles in Cuba would be an irritant to the US and help the interests of the entire socialist camp. Also, the deployment would include short-range tactical weapons (with a range of 40 km, usable only against naval vessels) that would provide a 'nuclear umbrella' for attacks upon the island.

By May, Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place strategic nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to the communists, especially in Latin America.

He said he wanted to confront the Americans 'with more than words. The logical answer was missiles.' : 29 The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy, writing their plans longhand, which were approved by on July 4 and Khrushchev on July 7. From the very beginning, the Soviets' operation entailed elaborate, known as '. All the planning and preparation for transporting and deploying the missiles were carried out in the utmost secrecy, with only a very few told the exact nature of the mission.

Even the troops detailed for the mission were given misdirection by being told that they were headed for a cold region and being outfitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas, and other winter equipment. The Soviet codename was. The flows into the, and Anadyr is also the of and a bomber base in the far eastern region.

All the measures were meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences. Specialists in missile construction under the guise of 'machine operators,' 'irrigation specialists,' and 'agricultural specialists' arrived in July. A total of 43,000 foreign troops would ultimately be brought in. Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, chief of the Soviet Rocket Forces, led a survey team that visited Cuba. He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by palm trees. The Cuban leadership was further upset when in September, the approved Joint Resolution 230, which expressed Congress's resolve to prevent the creation of an externally-supported military establishment. On the same day, the US announced a major military exercise in the Caribbean,, which Cuba denounced as a deliberate provocation and proof that the US planned to invade Cuba.

[ ] The Soviet leadership believed, based on its perception of Kennedy's lack of confidence during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, that he would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a fait accompli.: 1 On September 11, the Soviet Union publicly warned that a US attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships that were carrying supplies to the island would mean war. The Soviets continued the Maskirovka program to conceal their actions in Cuba. They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature. On September 7, assured that the Soviet Union was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba.

On September 11, the (Soviet News Agency TASS) announced that the Soviet Union had no need or intention to introduce offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. On October 13, Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State about whether the Soviets planned to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans. On October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy a personal message from Khrushchev reassuring him that 'under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.'

: 494 As early as August 1962, the US suspected the Soviets of building missile facilities in Cuba. During that month, its intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of Russian-built fighters and light bombers. Spyplanes found (NATO designation SA-2) surface-to-air missile sites at eight different locations. CIA director was suspicious. Sending antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he reasoned, 'made sense only if Moscow intended to use them to shield a base for ballistic missiles aimed at the United States.' On August 10, he wrote a memo to Kennedy in which he guessed that the Soviets were preparing to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba.

With important Congressional elections scheduled for November, the crisis became enmeshed in American politics. On August 31, Senator (R-New York), who received his information from Cuban exiles in Florida, warned on the Senate floor that the Soviet Union may be constructing a missile base in Cuba.

He charged the Kennedy administration of covering up a major threat to the US. Air Force General presented a pre-invasion bombing plan to Kennedy in September, and spy flights and minor military harassment from US forces at were the subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the US government. Map created by American intelligence showing Surface-to-Air Missile activity in Cuba, 5 September 1962 The first consignment of missiles arrived on the night of September 8, followed by a second on September 16.

The R-12 was a medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a warhead. It was a single-stage, road-transportable, surface-launched, storable liquid propellant fueled missile that could deliver a nuclear weapon.

The Soviets were building nine sites — six for medium-range missiles (NATO designation ) with an effective range of 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) and three for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (NATO designation SS-5 Skean) with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometres (2,800 mi). On October 7, Cuban President spoke at the: 'If.

We are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ.' Missiles reported The missiles in Cuba allowed the Soviets to target effectively most of the Continental US. The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami.

US intelligence received countless reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles. Only five reports bothered the analysts. They described large trucks passing through towns at night that were carrying very long canvas-covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering. Defensive missiles could turn. The reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed. A U-2 reconnaissance photograph of Cuba, showing Soviet nuclear missiles, their transports and tents for fueling and maintenance.

Aerial images find Soviet missiles The United States had been sending surveillance over Cuba since the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion. The first issue that led to a pause in reconnaissance flights took place on August 30, when a U-2 operated by the U.S. Air Force's flew over in the by mistake. The Soviets lodged a protest and the US apologized. Nine days later, a -operated U-2 was lost over western China to an SA-2. US officials were worried that one of the Cuban or Soviet SAMs in Cuba might shoot down a CIA U-2, initiating another international incident.

In a meeting with members of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) on 10 September, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor heavily restricted further U-2 flights over Cuban airspace. The resulting lack of coverage over the island for the next five weeks became known to historians as the 'Photo Gap.' No significant U-2 coverage was achieved over the interior of the island.

US officials attempted to use a to obtain coverage over reported Soviet military deployments, but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona KH-4 mission on 1 October was heavily covered by clouds and haze and failed to provide any usable intelligence. At the end of September, Navy reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Soviet ship Kasimov, with large crates on its deck the size and shape of fuselages. In September 1962, analysts from the (DIA) noticed that Cuban surface-to-air missile sites were arranged in a pattern similar to those used by the Soviet Union to protect its bases, leading DIA to lobby for the resumption of U-2 flights over the island. Although in the past the flights had been conducted by the CIA, pressure from the Defense Department made the authority be transferred to the Air Force. Following the loss of a CIA U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960, it was thought that if another U-2 were shot down, an Air Force aircraft arguably being used for a legitimate military purpose would be easier to explain than a CIA flight. When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized on October 9, poor weather kept the planes from flying.

The US first obtained U-2 photographic evidence of the missiles on October 14, when a flight piloted by Major took 928 pictures on a path selected by analysts, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site at, (now in ), in western Cuba. President notified On October 15, the CIA's (NPIC) reviewed the U-2 photographs and identified objects that they interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles. This identification was made, in part, on the strength of reporting provided by, a in the working for and. Although he provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, technical and doctrinal details of Soviet missile regiments that had been provided by Penkovsky in the months and years prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles on U-2 imagery.

That evening, the CIA notified the and at 8:30 pm, Bundy chose to wait until the next morning to tell the President. McNamara was briefed at midnight.

The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA's analysis of the images. At 6:30 pm EDT, Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisors, in a group he formally named the (EXCOMM) after the fact on October 22 by the National Security Action Memorandum 196.

Without informing the members of EXCOMM, President Kennedy tape recorded all of their proceedings, and Sheldon M. Stern, head of the Kennedy library transcribed some of them. Responses considered. President Kennedy meets in the Oval Office with General and the reconnaissance pilots who found the missile sites in Cuba. The US had no plan in place because its intelligence had been convinced that the Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba. The EXCOMM quickly discussed several possible courses of action: • Do nothing: American vulnerability to Soviet missiles was not new. • Diplomacy: Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles.

• Secret approach: Offer Castro the choice of splitting with the Russians or being invaded. • Invasion: Full force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro. • Air strike: Use the US Air Force to attack all known missile sites. • Blockade: Use the US Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba.

As the article describes, both the US and the Soviet Union considered many possible outcomes of their actions and threats during the crisis (Allison, Graham T.; Zelikow, Philip D.). This models how both actors would have considered their decisions. It is broken down into a simple form for basic understanding. The unanimously agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution.

They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the US from conquering Cuba. Kennedy was skeptical: They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin. Kennedy concluded that attacking Cuba by air would signal the Soviets to presume 'a clear line' to conquer Berlin.

Kennedy also believed that US allies would think of the country as 'trigger-happy cowboys' who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation. President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara in an EXCOMM meeting. The EXCOMM then discussed the effect on the strategic balance of power, both political and military.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance, but McNamara disagreed. An extra 40, he reasoned, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The US already had approximately 5,000 strategic warheads,: 261 but the Soviet Union had only 300. McNamara concluded that the Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter the strategic balance. In 1990, he reiterated that 'it made no difference. The military balance wasn't changed.

I didn't believe it then, and I don't believe it now.' The EXCOMM agreed that the missiles would affect the political balance. Kennedy had explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that 'if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States. The United States would act.'

: 674–681 Also, credibility among US allies and people would be damaged if the Soviet Union appeared to redress the strategic balance by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy explained after the crisis that 'it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality.' President Kennedy meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the Oval Office (October 18, 1962) On October 18, Kennedy met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs,, who claimed the weapons were for defensive purposes only. Not wanting to expose what he already knew and to avoid panicking the American public, Kennedy did not reveal that he was already aware of the missile buildup.

By October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights showed four operational sites. On the night of October 19 at 23:56 a helicopter from USS Essex CVS-9 squadron HSS-2 crashed into the Gulf of Mexico. James Robert Hughes and AM-3 George Blythe perished.

Their bodies were never recovered. On October 22, 1962 a second helicopter crashed into the Gulf, that also was from HSS-2 stationed on the Essex. Lost that night were Lt. Witkowski and Enlisted Serviceman 50 AZ Murphy. The details of the deaths of October 19, 1962 have never been provided to the families affected. There are numerous rumors that exist from bad storms, Soviet interference with the flight, or a one-way suicide recon mission.

However, the most consistently repeated accounts from on deck witnesses indicate that the helicopter on October 19 was 'shot down.' [ ] Operational plans Two Operational Plans (OPLAN) were considered.

OPLAN 316 envisioned a full invasion of Cuba by Army and Marine units, supported by the Navy following Air Force and naval airstrikes. However, Army units in the US would have had trouble fielding mechanized and logistical assets, and the US Navy could not supply enough amphibious shipping to transport even a modest armored contingent from the Army. OPLAN 312, primarily an Air Force and Navy carrier operation, was designed with enough flexibility to do anything from engaging individual missile sites to providing air support for OPLAN 316's ground forces. A US Navy of VP-18 flying over a Soviet cargo ship with crated on deck during the Cuban Crisis.

Kennedy met with members of EXCOMM and other top advisers throughout October 21, considering two remaining options: an air strike primarily against the Cuban missile bases or a naval blockade of Cuba. A full-scale invasion was not the administration's first option. McNamara supported the naval as a strong but limited military action that left the US in control.

However, the term 'blockade' was problematic. According to, a blockade is an, but the Kennedy administration did not think that the Soviets would be provoked to attack by a mere blockade. Additionally, legal experts at the and concluded that a declaration of war could be avoided if another legal justification, based on the for defense of the Western Hemisphere, was obtained from a resolution by a two-thirds vote from the members or the (OAS)., wrote a position paper that helped Kennedy to differentiate between what they termed a 'quarantine' of offensive weapons and a blockade of all materials, claiming that a classic blockade was not the original intention.

Since it would take place in international waters, Kennedy obtained the approval of the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defense provisions of the Rio Treaty: Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to the U.S. Commander South Atlantic [COMSOLANT] at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and a Marine battalion with lift were available if required.

In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers (Destroyers ARV D-11 Nueva Esparta' and 'ARV D-21 Zulia') and one submarine (Caribe) had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by November 2. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the 'quarantine.' The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship.

Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military officers to the U.S. To discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force informally offered three aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the 'quarantine' operation.

This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the and the. Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of goods and air transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba. The CNO's scenario was followed closely in later implementing the 'quarantine.' On October 19, the EXCOMM formed separate working groups to examine the air strike and blockade options, and by the afternoon most support in the EXCOMM shifted to the blockade option.

However, reservations about the plan continued to be voiced as late as the October 21, the paramount concern being that once the blockade was put into effect, the Soviets would rush to complete some of the missiles. Consequently, the US could find itself bombing operational missiles if blockade failed to force Khrushchev to remove the missiles already on the island. Speech to the nation. President Kennedy signs the Proclamation for Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba at the on October 23, 1962. At 3:00 pm EDT on October 22, President Kennedy formally established the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) with National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 196. At 5:00 pm, he met with Congressional leaders who contentiously opposed a blockade and demanded a stronger response.

In, Ambassador briefed Khrushchev on the pending blockade and Kennedy's speech to the nation. Ambassadors around the world gave notice to non- leaders. Before the speech, US delegations met with Canadian Prime Minister, British Prime Minister,, and French President to brief them on the US intelligence and their proposed response.

All were supportive of the U.S position. Shortly before his speech, Kennedy called former President. Kennedy's conversation with the former President also revealed that the two were conspiring during the Cuban Missile Crisis. On October 22 at 7:00 pm EDT, Kennedy delivered a nationwide televised address on all of the major networks announcing the discovery of the missiles. He noted: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. Kennedy described the administration's plan: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back.

This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948. During the speech, a directive went out to all US forces worldwide, placing them on 3.

The was designated for the blockade, with as Newport News 's escort. Crisis deepens. Khrushchev's October 24, 1962 letter to Kennedy stating that the blockade of Cuba 'constitute[s] an act of aggression.' On October 23, at 11:24 am EDT, a cable, drafted by to the US Ambassador in Turkey and, notified them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw what the US knew to be nearly-obsolete missiles from Italy and Turkey, in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Turkish officials replied that they would 'deeply resent' any trade involving the US's missile presence in their country.

Two days later, on the morning of October 25, US journalist proposed the same thing in his syndicated column. Castro reaffirmed Cuba's right to self-defense and said that all of its weapons were defensive and Cuba would not allow an inspection. International response Three days after Kennedy's speech, the Chinese announced that '650,000,000 Chinese men and women were standing by the Cuban people.' In West Germany, newspapers supported the US's response by contrasting it with the weak American actions in the region during the preceding months. They also expressed some fear that the Soviets might retaliate in Berlin.

In France on October 23, the crisis made the front page of all the daily newspapers. The next day, an editorial in expressed doubt about the authenticity of the CIA's photographic evidence. Two days later, after a visit by a high-ranking CIA agent, the newspaper accepted the validity of the photographs. Also in France, in the October 29 issue of, wrote in support of the American response. On October 24, sent a message to the Soviet embassy in Rome to be transmitted to the in which he voiced his concern for peace. In this message he stated, 'We beg all governments not to remain deaf to this cry of humanity.

That they do all that is in their power to save peace.' Soviet broadcast The crisis was continuing unabated, and in the evening of October 24, the Soviet news agency TASS broadcast a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy in which Khrushchev warned that the United States's 'outright piracy' would lead to war. However, that was followed at 9:24 pm by a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy, which was received at 10:52 pm EDT.

Khrushchev stated, 'if you weigh the present situation with a cool head without giving way to passion, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot afford not to decline the despotic demands of the USA' and that the Soviet Union views the blockade as 'an act of aggression' and their ships will be instructed to ignore it. Alert level raised. Shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations, October 25, 1962.

The US requested an emergency meeting of the on October 25. US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador in an emergency meeting of the Security Council, challenging him to admit the existence of the missiles. Ambassador Zorin refused to answer. The next day at 10:00 pm EDT, the US raised the readiness level of SAC forces to DEFCON 2.

For the only confirmed time in US history, bombers went on continuous airborne alert, and medium bombers were dispersed to various military and civilian airfields and made ready to take off, fully equipped, on 15 minutes' notice. One eighth of SAC's 1,436 bombers were on airborne alert, and some 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on ready alert, some of which targeted Cuba, and (ADC) redeployed 161 nuclear-armed interceptors to 16 dispersal fields within nine hours, with one third maintaining 15-minute alert status.

Twenty-three nuclear-armed B-52s were sent to orbit points within striking distance of the Soviet Union so that it would believe that the US was serious. Later estimated that about 80 percent of SAC's planes were ready for launch during the crisis; recalled that, by contrast: the Russians were so thoroughly stood down, and we knew it. They didn't make any move. They did not increase their alert; they did not increase any flights, or their air defense posture. They didn't do a thing, they froze in place. We were never further from nuclear war than at the time of Cuba, never further. By October 22, (TAC) had 511 fighters plus supporting tankers and reconnaissance aircraft deployed to face Cuba on one-hour alert status.

However, TAC and the had problems. The concentration of aircraft in Florida strained command and support echelons, which faced critical undermanning in security, armaments, and communications; the absence of initial authorization for war-reserve stocks of conventional munitions forced TAC to scrounge; and the lack of airlift assets to support a major airborne drop necessitated the call-up of 24 Reserve squadrons. On October 25 at 1:45 am EDT, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's telegram by stating that the US was forced into action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba, and when the assurances proved to be false, the deployment 'required the responses I have announced. I hope that your government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.' A declassified map used by the U.S.

Navy's Atlantic Fleet showing the position of American and Soviet ships at the height of the crisis. Blockade challenged At 7:15 am EDT on October 25, and attempted to intercept Bucharest but failed to do so. Fairly certain that the did not contain any military material, the US allowed it through the blockade. Later that day, at 5:43 pm, the commander of the blockade effort ordered the destroyer to intercept and the freighter Marucla. That took place the next day, and Marucla was cleared through the blockade after its cargo was checked.

At 5:00 pm EDT on October 25, William Clements announced that the missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on. That report was later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no slowdown at all. In response, Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199, authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft under the command of, which had the duty of carrying out first air strikes on the Soviet Union.

During the day, the Soviets responded to the blockade by turning back 14 ships that were presumably carrying offensive weapons. Stalemate The next morning, October 26, Kennedy informed the EXCOMM that he believed only an invasion would remove the missiles from Cuba.

However, he was persuaded to give the matter time and continue with both military and diplomatic pressure. He agreed and ordered the low-level flights over the island to be increased from two per day to once every two hours. He also ordered a crash program to institute a new civil government in Cuba if an invasion went ahead. At this point, the crisis was ostensibly at a stalemate.

The Soviets had shown no indication that they would back down and had made several comments to the contrary. The US had no reason to believe otherwise and was in the early stages of preparing for an invasion, along with a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union if it responded militarily, which was assumed. Secret negotiations At 1:00 pm EDT on October 26, of had lunch with Aleksandr Fomin, the cover name of, the in Washington, at Fomin's request. Following the instructions of the, Fomin noted, 'War seems about to break out.' He asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his 'high-level friends' at the State Department to see if the US would be interested in a diplomatic solution.

He suggested that the language of the deal would contain an assurance from the Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision and that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons again in exchange for a public statement by the US that it would avoid invading Cuba. The US responded by asking the government to pass a message to Castro that the US would be 'unlikely to invade' if the missiles were removed. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose. Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot.

We are ready for this. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962 On October 26 at 6:00 pm EDT, the State Department started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by Khrushchev. It was Saturday at 2:00 am in Moscow. The long letter took several minutes to arrive, and it took translators additional time to translate and transcribe it. Described the letter as 'very long and emotional.' Khrushchev reiterated the basic outline that had been stated to Scali earlier in the day: 'I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba.

Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear.' At 6:45 pm EDT, news of Fomin's offer to Scali was finally heard and was interpreted as a 'set up' for the arrival of Khrushchev's letter. The letter was then considered official and accurate although it was later learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his own accord without official backing. Additional study of the letter was ordered and continued into the night. Crisis continues Direct aggression against Cuba would mean nuclear war. The Americans speak about such aggression as if they did not know or did not want to accept this fact. I have no doubt they would lose such a war.

With V-750V 1D missile (NATO SA-2 Guideline) on a launcher. An installation similar to this one shot down Major Anderson's U-2 over Cuba. Castro, on the other hand, was convinced that an invasion of Cuba was soon at hand, and on October 26, he sent a telegram to Khrushchev that appeared to call for a on the US in case of attack.

However, in a 2010 interview, Castro expressed regret about his earlier stance on: 'After I've seen what I've seen, and, it wasn't worth it at all.' Castro also ordered all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba to fire on any US aircraft: the orders had been to fire only on groups of two or more. At 6:00 am EDT on October 27, the CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the four missile sites at San Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua la Grande appeared to be fully operational. It also noted that the Cuban military continued to organize for action but was under order not to initiate action unless attacked. [ ] At 9:00 am EDT on October 27, began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of the night before, the message offered a new trade: the missiles on Cuba would be removed in exchange for the removal of the missiles from Italy and Turkey. At 10:00 am EDT, the executive committee met again to discuss the situation and came to the conclusion that the change in the message was because of internal debate between Khrushchev and other party officials in the Kremlin.: 300 Kennedy realized that he would be in an 'insupportable position if this becomes Khrushchev's proposal' because the missiles in Turkey were not militarily useful and were being removed anyway and 'It's gonna – to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man, it will look like a very fair trade.'

Bundy explained why Khrushchev's public acquiescence could not be considered: 'The current threat to peace is not in Turkey, it is in Cuba.' McNamara noted that another tanker, the Grozny, was about 600 miles (970 km) out and should be intercepted. He also noted that they had not made the Soviets aware of the blockade line and suggested relaying that information to them via at the. A U-2F, the high altitude reconnaissance type shot down over Cuba, being refueled by a Q. The aircraft in 1962 was painted overall gray and carried USAF military markings and national insignia. While the meeting progressed, at 11:03 am EDT a new message began to arrive from Khrushchev.

The message stated, in part: 'You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety-nine miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Italy and Turkey, literally next to us. I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States.

Will remove its analogous means from Turkey. And after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made.' The executive committee continued to meet through the day. Throughout the crisis, Turkey had repeatedly stated that it would be upset if the missiles were removed.

Italy's Prime Minister, who was also Foreign Minister ad interim, offered to allow withdrawal of the missiles deployed in as a bargaining chip. He gave the message to one of his most trusted friends,, the general manager of, to convey to Bernabei was in New York to attend an international conference on satellite TV broadcasting. Unknown to the Soviets, the US regarded the Jupiter missiles as obsolescent and already supplanted by the Polaris nuclear ballistic submarine missiles.

The engine of the shot down over Cuba on display at in. On the morning of October 27, a U-2F (the third CIA U-2A, modified for air-to-air refueling) piloted by USAF Major, departed its forward operating location at, Florida. At approximately 12:00 pm EDT, the aircraft was struck by a ( designation ) launched from Cuba. The aircraft was shot down, and Anderson was killed. The stress in negotiations between the Soviets and the US intensified; it was only later believed that the decision to fire the missile was made locally by an undetermined Soviet commander, acting on his own authority. Later that day, at about 3:41 pm EDT, several US Navy aircraft, on low-level missions, were fired upon.

On October 28, 1962, Khrushchev told his son Sergei that the shooting down of Anderson's U-2 was by the 'Cuban military at the direction of.' At 4:00 pm EDT, Kennedy recalled members of EXCOMM to the and ordered that a message should immediately be sent to U Thant asking the Soviets to suspend work on the missiles while negotiations were carried out. During the meeting, General delivered the news that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy had earlier claimed he would order an attack on such sites if fired upon, but he decided to not act unless another attack was made. Forty years later, McNamara said: We had to send a U-2 over to gain reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming operational. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down that—the Cubans didn't have capabilities to shoot it down, the Soviets did—we believed if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air-missile unit, and that it would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict.

And therefore, before we sent the U-2 out, we agreed that if it was shot down we wouldn't meet, we'd simply attack. It was shot down on Friday. Fortunately, we changed our mind, we thought 'Well, it might have been an accident, we won't attack.' Later we learned that Khrushchev had reasoned just as we did: we send over the U-2, if it was shot down, he reasoned we would believe it was an intentional escalation.

And therefore, he issued orders to Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, to instruct all of his batteries not to shoot down the U-2. Drafting response. This section needs additional citations for. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (October 2017) () Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese restaurant in the neighborhood of Washington, DC, on the evening of October 27.

Kennedy suggested to take Khrushchev's offer to trade away the missiles. Unknown to most members of the EXCOMM, Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington to discover whether the intentions were genuine. The EXCOMM was generally against the proposal because it would undermine NATO's authority, and the Turkish government had repeatedly stated it was against any such trade. As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged, and Kennedy was slowly persuaded. The new plan called for him to ignore the latest message and instead to return to Khrushchev's earlier one.

Kennedy was initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal because a new one had been offered, but argued that it was still possible. White House Special Counsel and Adviser and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later, with a draft letter to that effect.

The President made several changes, had it typed, and sent it. After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting continued in the. The group argued that the letter should be underscored with an oral message to Dobrynin that stated that if the missiles were not withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them.

Rusk added one proviso that no part of the language of the deal would mention Turkey, but there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed 'voluntarily' in the immediate aftermath. The President agreed, and the message was sent. October 29, 1962 meeting held in the White House Cabinet Room. President Kennedy, and. At Rusk's request, Fomin and Scali met again. Scali asked why the two letters from Khrushchev were so different, and Fomin claimed it was because of 'poor communications.'

Scali replied that the claim was not credible and shouted that he thought it was a 'stinking double cross.' He went on to claim that an invasion was only hours away, and Fomin stated that a response to the US message was expected from Khrushchev shortly and urged Scali to tell the State Department that no treachery was intended. Scali said that he did not think anyone would believe him, but he agreed to deliver the message. The two went their separate ways, and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM. [ ] Within the US establishment, it was well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the first put Khrushchev in a terrible position. Military preparations continued, and all active duty Air Force personnel were recalled to their bases for possible action. Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood: 'We had not abandoned all hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev's revising his course within the next few hours.

It was a hope, not an expectation. The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday, and possibly tomorrow.' [ ] At 8:05 pm EDT, the letter drafted earlier in the day was delivered.

The message read, 'As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows: 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba. 2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba.' The letter was also released directly to the press to ensure it could not be 'delayed.' With the letter delivered, a deal was on the table. However, as Robert Kennedy noted, there was little expectation it would be accepted. At 9:00 pm EDT, the EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the following day.

Plans were drawn up for air strikes on the missile sites as well as other economic targets, notably petroleum storage. McNamara stated that they had to 'have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because we're going to need one; and secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because sure as hell they're going to do something there.' At 12:12 am EDT, on October 27, the US informed its NATO allies that 'the situation is growing shorter. The United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary.' To add to the concern, at 6:00 am, the CIA reported that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action. Navy helicopter hovers over Soviet submarine B-59, forced to the surface by U.S.

Naval forces in the Caribbean near Cuba (October 28–29, 1962) Later that same day, what the White House later called 'Black Saturday,' the US Navy dropped a series of 'signaling ' (practice depth charges the size of hand grenades ) on a Soviet submarine () at the blockade line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo with orders that allowed it to be used if the submarine was 'hulled' (a hole in the hull from depth charges or surface fire). The decision to launch these required agreement from all three officers on board, but one of them,, objected and so the launch was narrowly averted. On the same day a U-2 spy plane made an accidental, unauthorized ninety-minute overflight of the Soviet Union's far eastern coast. The Soviets responded by scrambling MiG fighters from; in turn, the Americans launched fighters armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles over the. On October 27, Khrushchev also received a letter from Castro, what is now known as the Armageddon Letter (dated the day before), which was interpreted as urging the use of nuclear force in the event of an attack on Cuba: 'I believe the imperialists' aggressiveness is extremely dangerous and if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and morality, that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be,' Castro wrote. Crisis ends On October 27, after much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles set in Turkey and possibly southern Italy, the former on the border of the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba.

Torrent Managing Successful Projects With Prince 2 Wiki. There is some dispute as to whether removing the missiles from Italy was part of the secret agreement. Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that it was, and when the crisis had ended McNamara gave the order to dismantle the missiles in both Italy and Turkey. At 9:00 am EST, on October 28, a new message from Khrushchev was broadcast on Radio Moscow. Khrushchev stated that 'the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as 'offensive' and their crating and return to the Soviet Union.' [ ] At 10:00 am, October 28, Kennedy first learned of Khrushchev's solution to the crisis to remove the 15 Jupiters in Turkey and the Soviets would remove the rockets from Cuba. Khrushchev had made the offer in a public statement for the world to hear.

Despite almost solid opposition from his senior advisers, Kennedy quickly embraced the Soviet offer. 'This is a pretty good play of his,' Kennedy said, according to a tape recording that he made secretly of the Cabinet Room meeting. Kennedy had deployed the Jupiters in March of the year, causing a stream of angry outbursts from Khrushchev. 'Most people will think this is a rather even trade and we ought to take advantage of it,' Kennedy said. Vice President was the first to endorse the missile swap but others continued to oppose the offer. Finally, Kennedy ended the debate. 'We can't very well invade Cuba with all its toil and blood,' Kennedy said, 'when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on the same missiles on Turkey.

If that's part of the record, then you don't have a very good war.' Kennedy immediately responded, issuing a statement calling the letter 'an important and constructive contribution to peace.' He continued this with a formal letter: I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. Removal of Missiles in Cuba November 11, 1962 – NARA – 193868 The US continued the blockade; in the following days, aerial reconnaissance proved that the Soviets were making progress in removing the missile systems.

The 42 missiles and their support equipment were loaded onto eight Soviet ships. On November 2, 1962, Kennedy addressed the US via radio and television broadcasts regarding the dismantlement process of the Soviet missile bases located in the Caribbean region.

The ships left Cuba on November 5 to 9. The US made a final visual check as each of the ships passed the blockade line. Further diplomatic efforts were required to remove the Soviet IL-28 bombers, and they were loaded on three Soviet ships on December 5 and 6. Concurrent with the Soviet commitment on the IL-28s, the US government announced the end of the blockade from 6:45 pm EST on November 20, 1962. At the time when the Kennedy administration thought that the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved, nuclear tactical rockets stayed in Cuba since they were not part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings and the Americans did not know about them.

However, the Soviets changed their minds, fearing possible future Cuban militant steps, and on November 22, 1962, told Castro that the rockets with the nuclear warheads were being removed as well. In his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador, Robert Kennedy informally proposed that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed 'within a short time after this crisis was over.' : 222 The last U.S.

Missiles were disassembled by April 24, 1963 and were flown out of Turkey soon afterward. The practical effect of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact was that the US would not invade Cuba.

It is possible that Khrushchev placed the missiles in Cuba only to get Kennedy to remove the missiles from Italy and Turkey and that the Soviets had no intention of resorting to nuclear war if they were out-gunned by the U.S. Because the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from NATO bases in Italy and Turkey was not made public at the time, Khrushchev appeared to have lost the conflict and become weakened. The perception was that Kennedy had won the contest between the superpowers and that Khrushchev had been humiliated. However, both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full conflict despite pressures from their respective governments.

Khrushchev held power for another two years.: 102–105 Aftermath.

From Genki Rocket's upcoming 'Genki Rockets II: No Border Between Us -Repackage-' I made a poor attempt at transcribing the lyrics below, but it was quite difficult to make out some parts. Im sure there are plenty of mistakes. Help is appreciated if you think you know what she's saying! LYRICS: Broken wings, we are trying to break free Broken pieces scattered everywhere Look deep inside, We're all the same We're in a circle, eternal dream Hear me sing, shiny dream Shuttle by, revive Do you feel what I feel, you and I connect Energy, glowing lights Shine on me, revive Every move, every thought We will synchronize Follow my heart beat, hang on to my dream Silent wind, flowing through the smoky air Overlapping shadows everywhere It's time to change, nothing is real.

Hi Everyone, you may have heard in all the E3 hype that we are launching a new premium subscription service called PlayStation Plus, so I just wanted to give you all a quick heads up on what you can expect to get from this great new service so you have all the info before launch on the 29th June. The first thing to note is that is still free to join and all the current features will remain free. PlayStation Plus will be offering you a service above and beyond this, including loads of content and exclusive, member-only, features. From 29th June you’ll be able to purchase a 1 year or 90-day membership from and instantly get your hands on the following premium features. Plus, if you sign up for a 1 year membership between 29th June and 3rd August, we’ll also throw in a free downloadable copy of the award winning. Games: As a member you can expect to get your hands on at least four games a month at no extra charge.

Each month there will be a selection of one PSN game, two and one PS one classics available on PlayStation Store for you to download. You also get premium avatars and dynamic themes each month, many of which are exclusive to members. Talking of exclusive, there will also be discounts available on loads of PlayStation Store content, just for members, so make the most of them as these will change each month as well.

Finally, wherever possible we’ll be making sure that members are included in some selected demos and beta trials before they go live to the public so you can be the one to tell all your mates about the next big game they ‘must’ get. Just the games, avatars and themes alone are worth at least £200* per year, so even before the other benefits, this service is great value for money Full Game Trial: This premium feature gives you the chance to try PSN and titles before you buy them in a whole new way. We are not talking normal demos of selected parts of a game here. With Full Game Trial, you can download the full game and play it as if you owned it for approximately one hour, depending on the game, before you decide if you want to buy it or not. So you can check out the online modes, play against friends or anything else you’d normally do with a game.

The other great thing is that your progress and trophies from the trial will all be unlocked if you buy the game so no need to go back and start again. Automatic Download: We wanted to offer members the speediest service possible so sign up and you can set your to automatically receive the latest game updates for all the games you play, PS3 system software updates and even have game demos sent directly to your PS3 without lifting a finger. Just set the time you want to receive them and your PS3 will automatically wake up and download everything, ready for when you next want to play. No more waiting to play your favourite game because there is a new patch or having to remember when the latest system software is launching, let your PS3 do the work.

Details of this great new service, including a list of content available for the first 2 months will be on between now and the 29th, but don’t forget to get on the Store and sign up before the 3rd August to get the added bonus of a free copy of LittleBigPlanet. It would be great to hear what you guys think of this new service and I’ll be back one here on Wednesday morning to try and answer any questions you have. Cheers, James.

The discounts thing sounds nice but please don’t stop the current discount system you have in play for those who do not take part of Plus. It was a pleasent surprise to see mushroom wars go up for 50%.

I’m also of opinion that early demos should be a default thing as well. It makes a big difference between choosing to pre-order a game and when not to. Alpha Protocol wasn’t really hyped but it looked great on paper and such but played bad. I almost feel bad for those that pre-ordered it and didn’t like it. You shouldn’t have to pay more to prevent that -especially since pre-orders themselves often cost a slight premium over Day1+ purchase.